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HOLD FOR RELEASE OU DELIVERY 
ADDRESS BY SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD (D., MONTANA) 
Before the 
Carolina Forum, The Univer sity of North Carolina 
Chapel Hill, North Carolina 
Monday, March 13, 1967 
8 :00p .m. (EST) 
CENrRAL CONCERNS OF .AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
Prior to my coming to Congress a quarter of a century ago, I 
thought my stock of solutions to the questions of foreign policy was 
quite adequate . In fact , as a teacher of history at the University of 
Montana, which I was, I had a touch of what Senator Fulbright might call 
the arr ogance of br ain power. In more common idiom, there were times 
when I thought I knew it all . That, may I say, is a failing common to 
exceptional histor ians, from Her odotus to Schlessinger. 
As a new Member of Congress, my background in history was highly 
useful . I also discovered, however , that my knowledge of international 
affairs did not go very far . It did not begin to provide much of an under-
standing, let alone answers, to the critical issues which were emer ging 
as \-/orld \o/ar II drew to a close . In those days , most of us in government 
suffer ed f r om serious imperfections in our notions of the outside world 
and widely- held but unfounded hopes for an automatic postwar peace under 
the United Nations. 
We took many wrong tacks- along with the right ones in the course 
of our foreign policy. For cany decades to come, historians will be en-
gaged in sorting out the one from the othE>r . ~·le made mistakes in Asia. 
\-le made them in Europe . We made them in the United Nations . We made them 
over the whole range of emerging new intE>rnational issues. 
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I, for one, felt my limitations and recognized the need to 
become a student again. My classroom was Congress, in Committee and on 
the floor. My extracurricular activity included a great deal of foreign 
travel, extensive reading and not a little reflection. 
To tnis day, a student I have remained; an expert I am not; and 
teaching is the profession to which, at some point, I may return. In the 
latter connection, I should note that my name is still carried, on leave 
of absence, on the roster of the University of Montana. Moreover, thanks 
to a seniority system in college teaching, second not even to that of the 
Congress, I now hold the rank of full Professor of History . 
I am constrained to point out that teaching and legislating are 
the two outstanding examples in American society of the application of a 
major tenet of ConfUcianism: that the accumulation of years is to be 
equated automatically and unquestioningly with the accumulation of wisdom. 
This principle, I know, is insufferable to the young, tolerable to the 
middle-aged, and a comfort to those full of years. At this point in time, 
I must confess that I find a system of seniority tolerably comfortable. 
For the present, I have no hesitancy in invoking the authority 
with which seniority endows me, in order that I may speak to you on what 
seems to me to be the central concerns of contemporary American foreign 
policy. Since the end of World War II, I have watched clusters of inter-
national problems coalesce into these concerns. The problems cover a 
whole range of new and tumultuous change. They are, in part, ironic by-
products of the immense acceleration of development in science, education 
and communication, transportation and other technologies . They are ex-
pressive of the explosion in population as well as the explosion of nuclear 
devices . They are indicative of the growth of human expectations and, 
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hopefully, of human enlightenment. They are problems, however, which 
despite these new twists, are still undergirded by the vast heritage of 
human ignorance, fear, want, and hostility from which no part of the 
gl.obe is free. 
The iceberg of change which has moved in international affairs 
during the past two decades helps to explain the emergence of the U.N. 
and other international organizations. It is relevant to the social in-
stability and the militarism which have largely followed the ending of 
19th century colonial er a, notably in Afri ca . It is involved in the 
Asian catacylsms--the great economic stirr ings in Japan, the immense un-
certainties which brood over India and Pakistan and the political tidal 
waves which, at intervals, have rolled through Chinese society. 
The many-sided changes in the human condition during the past 
two decades also explain the first military alliance in peacetime between 
ourselves and Western Europe as well as the first major military involve-
ments of the United States on the Asian mainland . They help to explain, 
finally, the awakening of this nation to the problems which confront the 
world and ourselves as participants in its indivisible desti ny. 
It used to be that we tended to stand apart and aloof from the 
affairs of the rest of the globe. Some have called that period of our 
history which led up to Wor ld War II, the age of isolation. The charac-
terization is glib and somewhat misleading. :·Te were not so much isolated 
as we were insulated by a fortuitous geographic endowment . The greater 
part of the nation's historic energies, therefore, could, and, fortunately 
did, go inward into the development of a rich, ample, and sparsely settled 
land . tfe had little need or inclination which would stimulate us to 
look much beyond this endowment for our needs and--if I may use the term--
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for our kicks . Except to sustain a limited curiosity and to satisfy a 
few exotic wants, we avoided an extensive overseas projection of American 
power, particularly outside the lfestern Hemisphere . From a distance, we 
were content to hold ourselves up to the rest of the world, on the basis 
of great material achievements and the political heritage of the American 
Revolution, as a prime example of the perfectability of the national ex-
perience . 
Since World War II, however, we have found ourselves plunged, 
hands, feet, ani bead into the mainstream of the world's affairs . \-le 
did not seek this role . '>le did not want it . Most of us still find the 
clothes of a great international power, costly, ill-fitting and uncom-
fortable. Nevertheless, we are unable to get out of them. There is even 
the probability that some of us have learned not only to tolerate this new 
garb, but to like it. 
In any event, as a sequel to World War II, this nation has come 
onto the center of the stage of international affairs. In this leading 
role we have expended an immense amount of resources, energy, and money 
for a great variety of purposes . We have developed all manner of costly 
intelligence and informational services. We have developed towering 
military services whose annual cost is now around $70 billion. 
We have fought one war in Asia, and are now engaged in a second. 
We have narrowly missed involvement in several other peripheral clashes 
elsewhere . More than twenty years after t-lorld Har II, we still have some-
thing on the order of agreements for mutual security 'fTi th 40 or more 
nations. These agreements, in effect, are commitments to military action 
everywhere on the globe, except, perhaps, the Antarctic. The strategic 
air force is on a minutes-alert. Intercontinental and other missiles are 
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pre-set for insto.~lt retaliatory launching . Day and night the Amer ican 
navy patrols the seven seas . American soldiers are stationed in many 
.1ations abroadj in Europe and Viet Ham, they number in tne hundreds of 
thousands . 
These far-flung commitments have been questioned from time to 
time . In my judgment, it is most proper that pertinent questions be 
raised about them . Not only do they involve great expenditures of public 
funds , they carry, at all times, immense implications for the ver y survival 
of the nation and civilization. As 1 see it, we have undertaken so many 
and scattered defense obligations that any need for the simultaneous honor-
ing of a group of these commitments would find us hard-pr essed to pr ovi de 
even a l i mited response . For that reason, if for no other, it seems to 
me we would be well-advised to look closely at these military commitments 
and activities and to weigh carefully their contempor ary value . 
I t would be futile, however, to consider them in a vacuum . 
Effective surveillance must relate to the central concerns of our for eign 
policy which, pr esumably, gave rise to them in the first place. It be-
hooves us to see as clearly as possible whether our under standing of these 
concer ns is up to date . It is incumbent upon us to test and test again 
the r eflexes of our policies not only for adequacy but for excess . 
It will serve no useful purpose to continue to measure these 
r eflexes of policy by the sort of gener alities which are expr essed by the 
terms "isolationism" or "inter nationalism. '' Hhatever may have been the 
case years ago, these yardsticks have long since lost their per tinence . 
The labels are no guarantee of the efficacy of any course of action or 
non-action i n international relations . ~.fhat is essential is not the name . 
What is essential is that the course is timely and adjusts the bonafide 
interests of the nation to the realities of the contemporary wor ld . 
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I speak in nll candor ;.rhen I say that there have been tendencies 
under both Democratic and Republican administrations for foreign policy to 
lag behind these realities . Until recently, a kind of inertia, for ex-
ample, has existed with regard to one of the central concerns of American 
foreign policy-- the United States-Soviet confrontation in Europe. Until 
recently, we have been most reluctant to bring ourselves to face, in policy, 
the changes which have taken place on that continent. 
To be sure, President Eisenhower sought in his administration to 
restore at least a measure of civility in the conduct of U.S.-Soviet affairs, 
by his personal associations with the leaders of the Soviet Union. To be 
sure, President Kennedy, in the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, removed a rigidity 
which, for years had decreed that agreements should not be concluded with 
the Soviet Union. It has only been in the last year or two, however, that 
as a nation we have begun to explore fully the implications of change in 
Europe and to react to its potentialities in terms of our interests and 
world peace. 
Yet substantial change has been manifest for some time in inner 
developments in both Eastern Europe and in Western Europe and between the 
two regions . In Eastern Europe, the immediate postwar isolation from the 
West was a severe one. It was compounded of political and war-born 
vendettas, ideological parochialisms, reci~cal fears and the in-turning 
of human energy to meet the massive demands of post-war reconstruction. 
Especially since the death of Stalin, however, there has been a general 
~ 
loosening of the ideological and other * ' t '.-jackets throughout Eastern 
Europe . There has also been a growing response on the part of governments 
there to consumer needs, the satisfaction of which involves greatly ex-
panded commerce with the non-Communist world . 
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As indicative of the breadth of change, communications, travel, 
cultural exchange and other contacts have grown r apidly between Eastern 
and \-I estern Europe. The rise of trade levels between the two regions has 
been very pronounced, and it should be noted that, Berlin Wall notwith-
standing, \-Test Germany leads all other non-Communist nations in commerce 
with Eastern Europe . 
For those who read the tea leaves of official sociability, more-
over, I would call attention to the recent visits of President Podgorny of 
the Soviet Union to Italy and the first reception of a Chief of that State 
by the Pope, as well as Premier Kosygin's warm receptions in Paris and 
London . One may attach such values as he chooses to these events . The 
facts of change in Europe, however , speak for themselves. The talk of 
war subsides; the sounds of intra-European cooperation are heard mor e 
clearly on all sides . The European detente has not only begun, it is 
already well-advanced. 
Our reaction to change in Europe includes the groundwork of 
President Eisenhower and President Kennedy as well as the bridge-building 
of President Johnson, all of which I have already mentioned . 
\/hat is involved in the latter case is a sustained effort in 
the direction of r estoring normalcy to our relations with the Soviet 
Union and a significant reduction in the military rivalry which, wittingly 
or unwittingly, could lead to a catastrophic conflict . 
A number of significant agreements with the Soviet Union are 
already involved in this effort . They deal with cultural exchanges, 
consular questions, commercial aviation, and the peaceful use of outer 
space. Negotiations are also anticipated, in the near future, to try to 
limit the incredibly costly rivalry of adding successive and reciprocal 
"antis" to the ballistic missile systems of each nation . An attempt is 
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also likely to be made to remove certain long-standing and self- imposed 
hindrances in law to our peaceful trade with the Eastern European countries. 
Many of these measures, of course, involve not only the President 
but also action by the Congress and, particularly, by the Senate. And, 
certainly, they involve under standing on the part of the people of the 
nation . However, emotions run deep on any question of U.S. relations with 
Communist nations, particularly, in the light of the bloody conflict in 
Viet Nam . I am frank to say that I have my own reticences about the pursuit 
of agreements with nations on one side of the globe, while a war against us 
is being waged with their help on the other . The best judgments we can 
obtain, however, tell us that the rejection of the contemplated agreements 
with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe will not make the slightest dif-
ference in the situation in Viet Nam . It will, in no way, diminish our 
casualties or hasten the conclusion of the conflict . 
In those circumstances, I do not see that it serves our purposes 
to turn our backs on agreements which would otherwise be in the interest 
of this nation . I do not see that we advance the cause of peace by re-
fusing to build more stable relations for peace whenever and wherever an 
opportunity to do so pr esents itself . 
Moreover , bridge-building to Eastern Europe is not unrelated to 
the possibility of making constructive changes in the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization, changes which would also serve the nation ' s interests . For 
many years, six divisions of American forces have been consigned to N.A.T.O. 
in Western Europe. These forces and their dependents involve a U.S . mili-
tary establishment in \-!estern Europe of well over half a million Americans . 
It is an undertaking which represents an expenditure of billions of dollars 
of public funds each year . Yet, I would not begrudge one cent of these 
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funds if I were persuaded that the six divisions were as essential to peace 
in Europe, today, as they were believed to be when dispatched there years 
a~ . 
But is that the case? I have already mentioned the change in the 
general climate in Europe which expresses itself in a rapidly growing trade 
ani the expansion of other friendly relations. It should also be noted that 
within Western Europe, there are obvious doubts about the need for the 
maintenance of N.A.T.O. at the str ength in which it was previously projected . 
Indeed, the French no longer see any requirement for the presence of u.s . 
forces, at least not in France, and they have withdrawn their own detach-
ments from N.A.T.O. Command . The United Kingdom has reduced its commitment 
of men and resources to the Continent and has announced further reductions 
unless West Germany is prepared to neutralize the exchange costs of main-
taining these forces on the Rhine . Other Western Europeans to a greater 
or lesser degree appear to regard their N.A .T .O. commitments in the same 
non-urgent fashion . 
It is now very evident that the United States alone has felt 
deeply the need to sustain the full military burden of the earlier common 
commitment to N.A.T.O. Our allies in Western Europe are much closer to 
the firing line; yet, in a period of unprecedented economic prosperity they 
are most unwilling to carry their pledged share . In effect, the Western 
Europeans have made adjustments in their commitments to N.A.T .O. to reflect 
over-all changes in Europe and they have made these adjustments unilaterally . 
The contrast in performance between ourselves and Western Europe 
regarding commitments to N.A .T.O. in my judgment, is becoming almost an 
embarrassment . It moves us apart from the mainstream of European develop-
ments and is likely to become a source of friction on both sides which, in 
the end, can only be harmful to the interests of both sides. 
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In all frankness, I find it difficult to acquiesce in Executive 
Branch fears for Western Europe 1 s safety which are obviously far greater 
than the fear of the Europeans themselves. In all frankness, I find some 
lack of dignity in the lengths to which these fears have carried our 
diplomacy. We have begged, badgered and buttered Western Europe in an 
effort to stimulate a greater contribution to N.A.T.O . In all frankness, 
I did not relish this nation having been placed in the position of wearing 
out its welcome in France . I should not like to see that experience re-
peated elsewhere in Europe. Yet it may well be repeated unless there is 
a willingness to make timely adjustments . 
I have, therefore, joined with 43 other Senators in the introduc -
tion of a resolution which recommends to the President that the Executive 
Branch make substantial reductions in the present deployment of our forces 
in Western Europe . Personally, I have felt for several years that two or 
three rather than six divisions would be more than sufficient to underscore 
our adher ence to the North Atlantic Treaty . That figure is in line with 
estimates of present need which have been advanced by General Eisenhower 
and General Gavin, both of whom have had a long association with this 
question. I find it most difficult to comprehend why two divisions are any 
less effective than six in serving notice that we regard the pledge of the 
North Atlantic Treaty as binding and our national security as inseparable 
from that of the North Atlantic region. To talk of six divisions as a 
manifestation of international resolution and two divisions as an indication 
of a revived isolationism is to reveal how irrelevant if not downright mis-
leading these terms have become . 
On the other side of the globe, in Asia, there looms another 
central concern of American foreign policy. It is the confrontation with 
China, across the littoral states of Korea, Japan, Taiwan and Viet Nam. 
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Almost two decades have passed since the collapse of the national 
government on the Chinese mainland and its retreat to the island of Taiwan . 
That event, which occurred when most of you were too young for it to be 
noticed, was catac,lysmic in its consequences . It sundered the fabric of 
Chinese society and, almost overnight, brought about the disintegration of 
a main pillar of postwar American foreign policy . In the rubble, the watch-
word became "wait for the dust to settle" before doing anything about China . 
Over the years, the cut-off of contact between ourselves and the 
Chinese mainland has become, for all practical purposes, total . Americans 
do not go there. Mainland Chinese do not come here. There is not only an 
absence of personal contact, there is also a complete absence of trade and 
communications . Indeed, of all the nations of the world we alone have not 
only maintained a primary boycott for many years but also seek to enforce 
a secondary boycott on Chinese exports. 
He have had brief confrontations with Chinese spokesmen on various 
issues over the years, notably at the Geneva Conferences of 1954 and 1962. 
Our sole continuing diplomatic contact with the Peking government, however, 
has been the meetings between the U. S. and Chinese Ambassadors in Poland 
which have gone on regularly for many years and at which no business of 
significance, so far as I am aware, has been conducted. 
In short, "waiting for the dust to settle," has remained the 
watchword of this nation ' s relations with three-quarters of a billion 
Chinese through the administrations of three Presidents . In truth, the 
dust has not settled. The initial hostility between a revolutionary China 
for which we had had little sympathy and ourselves was followed almost 
immediately by the Korean Conflict in which we became directly engaged in 
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military conflict with the Chinese . Thereafter came the near conflict at 
the islands ~f Quemoy and Matsu in the Taiwan Straits . And now, there is 
again conflict, this time, by proxy in Viet tram. 
Hithin China, during these years there have been momentous events 
which have al so added to the difficulties and uncertainties of developing 
a cohesive policy towards the Chinese mainland. The Chinese have exploded 
nucl ear devices at Lop Nor in the \·!estern Asian desert of Sinkiang. Recent 
ideological conflicts have sent great tremors through the whole of the inner 
political structure of China . There has been, finally, the great cleavage 
in Si no-Soviet revolutionary solidarity which has torn apart almost all of 
the relationships between the two giantnations of the Eurasian Continent . 
In the context of these events , it is not surprising that the dust, 
for the settlement of which American policy has waited eighteen years , is 
heavier than ever . The obscurity, moreover , is not likely to be dispelled 
in the near future . There i s nothing in the recent history of China which 
suggests that it will be easier tomorrow than it is today for us to see 
clearly a direction for effective pol icy. Hhatever course of American rela-
tions wi th China, it will have to be pursued in spite of the dust with which 
the situation is covered. 
Clear-cut choices cannot be expected to be available to us any 
time in the foreseeable future . On the contrary, American decisions respect-
ing China must inevitably contain a large measur e of subjectivity and prayer . 
Ever-present, will be the possi bility of error . These considerations , may 
I say, apply not only to what we may do respecting China but to what we do 
not do . The uncertainties and the risks exist no less in the principle of 
of non-approach to which we have adhered over these years of our times . 
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Hist~ry will someday es~imate the contribution of this principle--its addition 
to or subtracti~n from the interests of the United States and the stability 
and peace of the Hestern Pacific. 
Under the present approach, for example, we know from a distance 
that a great fire rages in the ~ore of Chinese Communism. The manifestations 
are plain in the roars of the Red Guards, in the denunciations and counter-
denunciations, in the sudden fall of long-established revolutionaries . They 
are documented in the inflamatory ideographs which are slashed over the 
streets and walls of Peking and the other citadels of Chinese Communist power . 
They are suggested in the political bewilderment which is seen in coastal 
cities and in the provinces along the inner borders of China and other remote 
areas . 
Indeed, the present turmoil , is such as to make clear that Communist 
political control which, for nearly two decades, was held by many to be total 
and irreversible and to extend all the way fr0m Moscow to the farthest reaches 
of China is actually considerably less than absolute, even in its extension 
from Peking to the distant Chinese provinces . 
He can also note, from afar, the serious difficulties between the 
Soviet Union and China. The strains have long been explicit in the ideologi -
cal realm. They have also become increasingly evident in the tension along 
the Sino-Soviet frontier which runs for thousands of miles between the two 
count ries. \·That appears involved here is an expression of the historic pro-
jection of Czarist Russian interests across the Asian mainland towards 
~laska and which, before it receded to more tractable limits, had spread 
even as far as California and Hawaii. This basic Russian projection to the 
East persists and rubs against China, at least in border regions of Manchuria, 
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Mongolia, and in Sinkiang Province . Conversely, an historic Chinese interest 
remains in many parts of Soviet Asia which at various times have been under 
at least nominal Chinese authority . The clash of national interests of the 
two nations, in short, is very real and so, too, are the irredentist hostili-
ties which it engenders. 
These hostilities have been a major element in the cycle of ever-
increasing bitterness in Chinese-Soviet relations over the past few years . 
How long this cycle will last and how it will end are matters of conjecture . 
Whatever the possibilities, if any, of more effective adjustment of our 
policies in the light of this and other trends, however, we are inhi bited 
from their pursuit by our current approach or, rather, non-approach to 
mainland China. 
Let me turn, finally, to the immediate and over-riding problem of 
policy, to the situation in Viet Nam. Viet Nam affects every other aspect 
of our foreign relations aP~, particularly, the two central concerns . It 
diminishes our capacity to deal constructively with the United States-Soviet 
confrontation in Europe . To put it mildly, it multiplies the problems of 
the confrontation with China in Asia. 
It is ironic that once again in Viet Nam, as in Korea, a country 
so small and remote from our interests as to be outside the range of even 
public curiosity a few years ago has become the major preoccupation of the 
United States . It is ironic that, for the second time in a generation, we 
find ourselves in a devastating war on the borders of China--not with China--
but with a people who have had no tradition of hostility towards the United 
States and who have far more historic reason than do we for mutual hostility 
with the Chinese. 
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H~w deeply we are engaged in this ironic situation is indicated 
by the current c~ncentration of United States mil itary force in Southeast 
Asia and, particularly, in Viet Nam. We hsve well in excess of 4oo,ooo 
military personnel on the ground in South Viet ITam. There are al so approxi -
mately 75, 000 men on the 7th Fleet in adjacent waters and 35, 000 more in 
Thailand with responsibiliti es that are tied cl osely into the situation in 
VietNam. In short, we have committed to this confl ict over 500, 000 members 
of the Armed Servic es and materiel and equipment i n unprecedented quantiti es 
and this immense consignment is supported by additional mil itary strength 
of all kinds on Okinawa, the Philippines , and Guam. 
He are i n a limited war in which, by becoming deeply engaged, we 
have managed to save from collapse the gover nment of South Viet Nam i n Sai gon. 
The objectives of our mil itary engagement are confi ned entirely to the 
southern half of Viet Ham. This limited war of l imited objectives, never-
theless, has already engaged more American forces than Korea . It has cost 
more than Korea . It has incurred plane and helicopter l osses greatly in 
excess of those in Korea . It is a more difficul t and dangerous war than 
Korea . It is a more bitter and barbaric war . It i s a war whose end i s not 
yet in sight, by military a ction or by a negotiated diplomatic solution . 
That is the reality of the situation in VietNam. The more can-
didly it is faced the better off we will be . At this point, the question 
of how or why we became invol ved is moot and so are regrets over our invol ve-
ment . In my judgment, the question now i s how can this war be ended at the 
soonest possibl e moment in an honorable peace for ourselves and for all 
deeply enmeshed in it. In short, the question is how can it be ended under 
honorabl e circumstances , before the spreading devastation, not only in North 
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Viet Nam, but even more, in South Viet Ham, makes a hideous mockery of the 
original objective ~f helping the Vietnamese people. 
I do not believe that we can end this war by slogans of "get in or 
get out." It cannot be ended by personal criticism of the President and 
the Vice President, Ambassador Goldberg and other leaders of the Administra-
tion or members of the Senate, regardless of the positions which they take 
on this issue. I am frank to say that this criticism, at times, goes far 
beyond the merely ungracious and borders on the disgraceful. President 
Johnson wants this war ended in an honorable peace and every Senator I know, 
and I know them all, wants the same thing. If there are differences among 
us they are differences of understanding, interpretation, and method. 
In my personal view, and I have made it clear many times, the 
conflict cannot be terminated in an honorable fashion by a withdrawal of 
the United States at this time although an honorable settlement must even-
tually involve the withdrawal of United States forces. 
The only practical avenue which I see open, for the present, is 
to seek to mitigate the horror of the conflict and to restrain its spread, 
while endeavoring to pursue any avenue, byway, route or whatever, as the 
President has sought to do, which might lead to the negotiating table. That 
there has not yet been an initiation of substantial contact for peace is no 
argument against the continuance of the effort to make that contact. There 
can be no relaxation until the war is brought to an end in negotiations. 
It is essential that we pursue peace in Viet Nam in all sincerity and with 
all diligence not only because, in this situation, peace has a rational and 
moral validity, but also because a prompt settlement is in the interests of 
the Vietnamese people and the interests of the American people. 
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I must say, with great regret, that signs of a settlement in the 
near future are l acking . There is, instead, the fact of an ugly war of 
spreading devastation. All the while, the ~pti~ns are running out; the 
alternatives which might lead to negotiations grow fewer . 
Many pr0posals have been put forth and many have been explored. 
As an example, over the past year or more I have publicly called attention 
to these possible easements of the situation and for eventual settlement: 
1. In lieu of aerial bombardment of North Viet Nam, 
the sealing off of the borders of the 17th parallel, 
through Laos; 
2. A reconvening of the Geneva Conference on the basis 
of the 1954 and 1962 agreements by call of the co-
chairmen, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, 
or by any participating conferees; 
3· An all-Asian conference at Rangoon or Tokyo or any 
other suitable location to consider the conditions 
of an honorable peace; 
4. The inclusion in any peace conference of whatever 
belligerents may be necessary to bring about a 
termination of the conflict in Viet Nam; 
5. An enlargement of the Manila Conference of 1966 into 
a follow-up conference, to i nclude friend and foe alike; 
6. A face -to-face meeting of the Secretary of State, Dean 
Rusk, and the Foreign Minister of the Peking government 
to discuss the restoration of peace in Viet Nam. 
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In additi~n, I have urged that the cl~sest consideration be given 
to informed French views on Viet Nam and to the views of the Cambodian 
Premier, Prince Norodrym Sihanouk. I have urged that the proposals of U Thant 
and Mrs. Gandhi be considered. I have endorsed various statements of the 
President, Secretary Rusk, and Ambassador Goldberg, all of which have made 
clear that not only our proposals but also those of Hanoi and the People's 
Liberation Front might provide a basis for settlement. I have recommended 
that there be not just a cessation of the bombing of North Viet Nam but 
that all killing stop, on both sides, in a cease-fire and standfast, on 
the ground and in the waters adjacent to Viet Nam as well as over Viet Nam, 
to the end that efforts may be made to initiate talks. 
In some of these proposals, the President has concurred and has 
had them pursued by his diplomats. All of them, he has had examined and 
if they have not been pursued, I can only conclude that there have been 
sound reasons for not pursuing them. Suggestions for peace have come from 
many sources; the actual pursuit of peace in the past year, however, has 
been by diplomacy and, largely, by secret diplomacy . Indeed, that is the 
case even with the efforts of the distinguished Secretary General of the 
United Nations 1 U Thant. In his attempts to bring about peace in Viet Nam, 
U Thant has acted in his personal and diplomatic capacity rather than in his 
Secretarial capacity of carrying out organizational decisions of the United 
Nations. 
The fact is that the U. N., as an organization, has not yet 
entered into the Vietnamese problem. Some limited useoof the U. N. in this 
fashion, may I say, was proposed in an address which I delivered at Johns 
Hopkins University in November, 1966. At the time, it was not suggested 
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that the United nations be brought direct~ into the substance of the dispute; 
that course presents great difficulties because neither North Viet Nam nor 
China are member states . Hhat I did suggest, however, was an entirely 
proper and precedented procedural initiative by the United Nations. The 
Security Council can issue, at any time, by majority vote a call to all 
belligerents in Viet Nam to convene in its forum. It would be entirely in 
order for an invitation of this kind to include both China and North Viet Nam. 
It was further 8 uggested last November that a basis for a negoti-
ated settlement could begin to be sought in a Security Council request to 
the International Court for an advisory opinion on the applicability of the 
Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962. I am delighted to note, in passing, that 
Congress only last week expressed its overwhelming formal endorsement of 
these agreements as a basis for a negotiated settlement . 
I betray no confidences when I note that, on request, I interrupted 
a brief vacation last fall to go to New York for the sole purpose of discuss -
ing these two proposals regarding the possible usage of the U. N. organizatio. 
with Ambassador Goldberg and the Secretary-General. On the basis of these 
discussions it seemed preferable at the time that the search for peace then 
being actively pursued be continued via the private avenues of diplomacy 
rather than in the forum of the Security Council . 
That was many weeks and months ago . In the interim, intense and 
many-sided efforts of diplomacy have been exerted through many private 
channels to find the key to peace . Hopes rose during the cease-fires at 
the Christmas holidays and at Tet, the Oriental New Year. However, in the 
end, diplomacy not only was unable to find a road to negotiations , it was not 
able even to bring about an extension of these truces . 
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The Pope tried. The Russian and British leaders have tried. The 
Secretary~eneral ~f the U. N., in his diplomatic capacity, has tried. 
Ambassador Goldberg has tried countless times. Many other diplomats and 
officials of the Executive Branch of the government have tried. 
The strenuous efforts of traditional diplomacy have been unavail-
ing . As indicated by recent statements of both Ambassador Goldberg and 
U Thant , the slender reed of hope has shrivel ed. There is now no immediate 
prospect on the hor izon, except f or the intensification of the confl ict. 
That, indeed, is already in progr ess . The casual ties increase; the devasta-
tion grows; the dangers of expanded war multiply. 
In the circumstances , it seems to me that a contribution to peace 
might well be sought in public from the United Nations as an organization. 
The Secretary~eneral's personal efforts to date have been dedicated and 
strenuous and he is entitl ed to the gratitude and support of the entire 
world community. With a11 due r espect , however , there are other resources 
for peace inherent in the Uni ted Nations, as an ~rganization, which have 
gone untapped and untried. The u. N. does have a responsibility to try to 
contribute to the r esolution of thi s confl ict . That responsibil ity is 
expli cit i n the Char ter and every member nati on, including ourselves, 
shar es that r esponsibility by sol emn Treaty obl igation . 
It seems to me that the cause of a peaceful and honorabl e settle-
ment may possibly be advanced--certainly it cannot be hurt--by modest recourse 
at this time to the procedural machinery of the United Nations . In my judg-
ment, this nation should consi der seeking a face - to-face confrontation of 
all belligerents at the United Nations . Following the Korean precedents, 
it seems to me eminently desirable that this government give every considera-
tion to a possible initiative which would bring to a v~te in the Security 
Council two resolutions along the following lines: 
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~ne, that the Security Council invite all belligerents, direct 
and indirect, including China and North Viet Nam, to participate in an 
open discussion of the conflict in Viet Nam and ways and means of ending 
it; 
Two, that the Security Council request the International Court 
to render an advisory opinion on the current applicability of the Geneva 
Accords of 1954 and 1962 and the obligations which these agreements may 
place on the present belligerents in Viet Nam. 
1.Jbether or not there is much prospect of a positive response from 
others in no way lessens the desirability of offering these resolutions in 
good faith and bringing them to a vote . In my judgment, an American initia-
tive of this kind serves not only our interests but the interests of peace 
in Viet Nam. 
Let me conclude, now, by clarifying one point: the conflict in 
VietNam cannot be settled from the Congress or from the campus. In the 
end, if it is to be settled honorably, there is only one Constitutional 
officer of your government who can speak for you and for the entire nation 
in its foreign relations . \.Jbether we agree with him or not, whether we like 
him or not, whether we abhor him or love him, that man is the President of 
the United States . 
In a government such as ours, a Senator lives with a Constitution, 
a constituency, and a conscience. All three considerations underlie the 
suggestions respecting Viet Nam which have been made here today and others 
which have been expressed on other occasions. President Johnson and all 
the Presidents who have gone before him have listened to advice from many 
sources, including the Senate . 
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It is the President, however, who makes the fundamental decisions 
of foreign policy. These decisions are of an immensity which enjoins upon 
us all a high respect for the burdens which a President must bear and a 
responsibility to tender to him every support which can be given in good 
conscience. In the end, these decisions will determine--insofar as it lies 
with this nation to determine--the moment of peace in Viet Nam and Asia. 
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